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Surrogacy Professionalism
By
June Carbone* and Christina O. Miller**
The fertility business generally, and surrogacy1 in particular,
is facing a crossroads. A variety of forces are increasing the returns to scale and the ease of operation across jurisdictional borders.2 As fertility clinics and their affiliated brokers get larger,
they rely more heavily on customers willing to travel to access
their services. As a result, they find it easier to evade regulations
in their home jurisdiction that may prohibit surrogacy, limit payment, or forbid options such as sex selection.
In the United States, clinics have adjusted to the new environment by consolidating and by creating platforms or enlisting
brokers that take advantage of the growing market. The clinics
often compete to bring the wealthy of the world to the United
States. The percentage of foreign residents using American surrogacy services, for example, has risen steadily in the last decade
and now constitutes approximately twenty percent of American
surrogacy cases.3 At the same time, some of the same clinics may
* Robina Chair in Law Science and Technology, University of Minnesota
Law School.
** Managing Partner, Reproductive Family Center, Kansas City, Missouri.
1 We are using the term “surrogacy” here to refer to any arrangement in
which a woman gives birth to a child pursuant to an agreement with another
person who will assume legal responsibility for the child. We use the term “gestational carrier” to refer to a woman “who has agreed to carry a pregnancy
created through an in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) which encompasses retrieval
and fertilization with the resulting embryo transferred to her uterus through an
IVF transfer.” Susan L. Crockin, Who’s My Client? Recognizing and Avoiding
Conflicts of Interest in ART Law Representation, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 14, 18 (Fall
2011). The embryo may be created through use of donor egg or sperm, or the
intended parents’ gametes or a combination of gamete from a donor and one
from the intended parents.
2 See June Carbone & Jody Lyneé Madeira, Buyers in the Baby Market:
Toward a Transparent Consumerism, 91 WASH. L. REV. 71 (2016) (describing
forces producing the consolidation and expansion of large fertility clinics and
encouraging operation across jurisdictional lines).
3 Kiran M. Perkins, et al, Trends and Outcomes of Gestational Surrogacy
in the United States, 106 FERTILITY & STERILITY 435 (2016).
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arrange for American patients to travel abroad to access cheaper
in vitro fertilization (IVF) services or procedures such as threeparent IVF unavailable in the United States.
Given these changes, it is difficult for any single jurisdiction
to control the options available to its citizens. This article argues
that as the fertility business matures, the opportunities to address
ethically questionable practices may come more from the oversight of professionals than from regulation of the process through
traditional jurisdiction-based regulations. In the surrogacy context, in particular, lawyers are essential to establishing
parenthood and overseeing the agency-client, intended parentgestational carrier relationships. Professional associations and licensing units can and should establish standards for responsible
practices.
This article will examine the changing nature of the fertility
business and the opportunities for and need to address professional responsibility for the resulting transactions. Section I will
describe how greater opportunities for cross-jurisdictional arrangements create greater regulatory challenges and tradeoffs,
concluding that a traditional regulatory approach is intrinsically
limited in addressing the potential ethical issues. Section II will
discuss the role of contracts – and lawyers who draft such contracts – in structuring surrogacy transactions. Section III will
consider the potential role of stronger professional guidance in
standardizing surrogacy practice, and offering protection for vulnerable participants in the process.

I. The Limits of Regulation
Jurisdictions that wish to influence fertility developments
face a series of tradeoffs. First, they can ban or severely restrict
services such as surrogacy, hoping to limit its practice within the
jurisdiction, but effectively losing control of residents who go
outside the jurisdiction to access it. Second, they can adopt
friendly regulations, such as provisions that guarantee intended
parents recognition of their legal status if the parents comply
with certain procedures. The more lenient the requirements,
however, the more likely they are to ensure widespread compliance; the more restrictive they are, the more likely they will encourage evasion that undermines their effectiveness. Finally, the
jurisdiction can do nothing. The failure to adopt laws regulating
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fertility procedures has two effects. It constitutes a refusal to
place the imprimatur of the state on the practices, which is often
enough to satisfy religious groups who disapprove of IVF or surrogacy altogether.4 At the same time, the failure to act leaves
prospective parents in limbo in the event of disputes.
None of these approaches, however, comprehensively addresses the full range of surrogacy practices. Even surrogacy
friendly jurisdictions that validate core provisions such as the determination of the intended parents’ legal status and the promise
of payment to gestational carriers do not address a range of other
issues, such as the permissibility of abortion provisions, the regulation of conduct during pregnancy, the transfer of multiple embryos or other matters that may affect understandings of the
contracting parties.
This section will argue, first, that the reach of the regulations
that do exist is necessarily limited. Jurisdictions can exercise authority over providers within their borders, and they can restrict
the availability of commercial brokers. Their ability to determine
parentage for their residents for a child born outside the jurisdiction, though, is limited,5 and they are unlikely to be able to prevent wholesale evasion for those willing to travel. The section
will then identify the missing aspects of surrogacy regulation.

4 See, e.g., Donum Vitae, VATICAN (Feb. 22, 1987), http://www.vatican
.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_
respect-for-human-life_en.html (determining both heterologous and homologous artificial fertilization to be unacceptable); John M. Haas, Begotten Not
Made: A Catholic View of Reproductive Technology, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (1998), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-lifeand-dignity/reproductive-technology/begotten-not-made-a-catholic-view-of-reproductive-technology.cfm (“One reproductive technology which the Church
has clearly and unequivocally judged to be immoral is in vitro fertilization or
IVF.”).
5 See discussion of the European efforts to restrict recognition of parentage for children born abroad, infra in text at notes 47-50. In the United States,
the State of Washington has attempted to determine the parentage of its residents even if the child is born in another state, but the validity of the provisions has not yet been tested. See 22 FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
HANDBOOK 26.26.021 (Washington Practice 2016 ed.).
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A. The Growth in Cross-Border Surrogacy Practice
Cross-border travel has spurred surrogacy growth in the
United States and elsewhere. Many countries ban surrogacy entirely, limit it to married, heterosexual couples,6 or restrict it to
altruistic arrangements where, for example, a sister agrees to
carry a child genetically related to a sibling without payment.7
For many people, therefore, the ability to gain access to surrogacy requires the ability to travel to a surrogacy friendly jurisdiction, whether within the Unites States or abroad.8 Moreover, as
international surrogacy restrictions increase, more foreign residents come to the United States to arrange surrogate births.9
Stuart Bell, the chief executive of Growing Generations, a Los
Angeles surrogacy agency, stated that four years ago, “only
about 20 percent of its clients came from overseas, but now international clients are more than half.”10
In the United States as a whole, gestational carrier cycles
have increased from approximately 1% of all IVF cycles in 1999
to approximately 2.5% of all cycles in 2013.11 During the same
period, the number of carrier cycles where the intended parent or
parents were not U.S. residents increased from just below 10% to
over 18% of all carrier cycles.12 The overall changes, however,
cloak a substantial drop between 1999 and 2005, with the percentage of foreign resident carrier cycle falling to below 3%, but
Cyra Akila Choudhury, The Political Economy and Legal Regulation
of Transnational Commercial Surrogate Labor, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1,
7-8 (2015) (observing that India has banned the availability of surrogacy to foreign, unmarried and same-sex couples.
7 Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2271 (2012) (noting, for
example, that Canada and Australia criminal commercial surrogacy while permitting altruistic arrangements).
8 Carbone and Madeira, supra note 2 (describing conditions producing
cross-border surrogacy).
9 Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It: Foreign
Couples Heading to American for Surrogate Pregnancies, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/foreign-couples-heading-to-ameri
ca-for-surrogate-pregnancies.html [https://perma.cc/7X8P-5JWT]. See also Eric
Blyth, Fertility Patients’ Experiences of Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 94
FERTILITY & STERILITY e11 (2010).
10 Lewin, supra note 9, Blyth, supra note 9.
11 Perkins, et al, supra note 3, at 437, Figure 1.
12 Id. at 438, Figure 2.
6
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then rising steadily thereafter.13 The dramatic drop in overall
surrogacy rates (and foreign resident rates in particular) came
with expanding surrogacy markets abroad, particularly in India.
Since then, however, many countries have restricted access, limiting surrogacy to their own citizens or banning it together.14 As
that has happened and with American clinics’ increased efforts to
recruit abroad,15 surrogacy in the United States has grown steadily with an increasing portion of the intended parents coming
from other countries. Even within the United States, intended
parents “shop” on national sites in their search for surrogate
friendly jurisdictions.16
B. Buy-in v. Evasion
Jurisdiction-based approaches that attempt to regulate individuals and providers within a given jurisdiction have produced
wholesale evasion – and are likely to continue to do so. In the
face of this evasion, jurisdictions can choose either to accept the
practices and regulate them, or to ban them and lose control of
the out-of-jurisdiction arrangements. American surrogacy law is
confusing, inconsistent, evolving, and difficult to categorize.17
Id.
Danielle Preiss & Pragati Shahi, Dwindling Options for Surrogacy
Abroad, ATLANTIC (May 31, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2016/05/dwindling-options-for-surrogacy-abroad/484688/.
15 See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in
the Global Market for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQ. 277, 291-92 (2009)
(emphasizing that reproductive services take place in a context broader than
the doctor-patient relationship). See also International Programs, FERTILITY INhttp://www.fertility-docs.com/programs-and-services/internationalSTITUTES,
programs.php [https://perma.cc/K6PL-5MF7] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (describing international programs).
16 See Nicole Grather & Adam May, Going Global for a Family: Why
International Surrogacy Is Booming, ALJAZEERA AM. (May 12, 2014, 7:30 PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/5/12/going-global-forafamilywhyinternationalsurrogacyisbooming.html [https://perma
.cc/2LUY-U39H] (describing the role of brokers in the growth of fertility
tourism).
17 See, e.g., Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the Law, and the
Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 487 (2015) (describing laws in this area
as complicated and subject to change).
13
14
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The majority of American states have no surrogacy specific statutes.18 American jurisdictions split in the following ways:
1. Some choose to accept the practice and clarify the
determination of parentage.19
California, for example, allows the commissioning parents to
obtain a parental rights confirmation order before birth that confers parenthood on the intended parents.20 To obtain such an
order, the commissioning parents need to enter into a contract
with the gestational carrier before implantation of the embryos in
the carrier, insure that the carrier has had legal representation,
and specify in the contract how the medical costs associated with
the child’s birth will be paid.21
The California approach provides certainty in the determination of parenthood, tries to insure payment of medical expenses, and mandates legal representation in the contracting
process, but does not otherwise dictate contractual terms or
procedures.
Only a relatively small number of states, however, have such
express statutory provisions available to all intended parents who
might choose to use surrogates to arrange a birth.22
2. A few limit surrogacy, but provide protections for those
who comply with state requirements.
Illinois, for example, limits recognition to intended parents
who:
(1) contribute at least one of the gametes resulting in a preembryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to
carry to term;
(2) have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician’s affidavit attached to
the gestational surrogacy;
Id. at 485-503 (summarizing state law).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-48a(b) (West 2011).
20 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (2016).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-407 (2017); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1933 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:11 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.710 (2013); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT,
2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 6 (S.S.B. 6037).
18
19
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(3) have completed a mental health evaluation; and
(4) have undergone legal consultation with independent legal counsel regarding the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract and the potential legal consequences of
the gestational surrogacy.23
The couples who meet these requirements and comply with
the statutory procedures receive recognition as parents before
birth; those who cannot meet the requirements remain free to
secure legal recognition through adoption after the birth.24
3. Some try to discourage surrogacy without explicitly
banning it.
States generally do so in one of two ways. They may ban
commercial surrogacy, discouraging agencies who might try to facilitate the process, but allowing altruistic arrangements that do
not involve payment.25 Or, they may, like New Jersey, specify
that the woman who gives birth is the legal parent absent adoption. The surrogate who agrees to surrender her child can do so,
seventy-two hours after the birth.26 Even if the birth mother
agrees to an adoption, New Jersey allows her a period after the
child’s birth in which she can change her mind. At the same
time, New Jersey may also recognize the man who provided the
sperm as a legal parent,27 even if the gestational carrier is married.28 This means a commissioning father could find that a gestational carrier will receive custody and can command child
support.29
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/20 (2005).
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2018); TEX. FAM. CODE § 160-751
through § 160-763 (2018).
25 June Carbone & Jody Lyneé Madeira, The Role of Agency: Compensated Surrogacy and the Institutionalization of Assisted Reproduction Practices,
90 WASH. L. REV. (ONLINE) 7 (2015). Washington, however, which had been
the prime example, adopted the Uniform Parentage Act provisions authorizing
commercial surrogacy as this article was going to print. See UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT, 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 6 (S.S.B. 6037) (West).
26 See A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2000).
27 Id.
28 See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter
of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
29 J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742-47 (Ohio 2007) (Cupp, J., dissenting).
23
24
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4. Some prohibit surrogacy outright.30

Michigan has the most draconian laws. It imposes criminal
penalties on anyone involved in surrogacy, providing that a woman who agrees to become a surrogate can be prosecuted for a
misdemeanor and fined up to $10,000 and/or imprisoned for up
to a year, while anyone involved in making a surrogacy arrangement is subject to a penalty five times greater.31 It also recognizes the birth mother’s husband as a legal parent and makes it
relatively difficult to rebut the marital presumption. In the event
of a dispute, the surrogate will be deemed the legal parent, and
efforts to challenge that result could expose a commissioning
couple to prosecution for the violation of state law prohibiting
surrogacy.32 States like New York and Indiana, in contrast, just
make surrogacy agreements void as a violation of public policy.33
5. They can do nothing.
The majority of states have no comprehensive legislation
and many have few or no reported cases.34 Missouri and Minnesota, for example, have almost no laws directly addressing surrogacy. In these states, surrogacy still takes place, and the courts
have had to resolve disputes, though often without producing re30 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851–.863 (2018) (declaring
surrogate parentage contracts, as defined by statute, to be “void and
unenforceable” and imposing criminal penalties for participation in a
“surrogate parentage contract for compensation” or a surrogacy contract
involving a surrogate who is an unemancipated minor or who has “a mental
illness or developmental disability”).
31 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859.
32 Michigan’s law has been described as “arguably the most anti-surrogacy law in the country” and as one offering no recourse to the intended parents in the event of a dispute. See Chelsea VanWormer, Outdated and
Ineffective: An Analysis of Michigan’s Gestational Surrogacy Law and the Need
for Validation of Surrogate Pregnancy Contracts, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 916
(2012).
33 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2016)(“it is against public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate to . . . . Provide a gamete to conceive a child [ ] Become pregnant . . . Waive parental rights
or duties to a child”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (2016) (“Surrogate parenting
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are
void and unenforceable.”).
34 Morrissey, supra note 17, at 485-503.
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ported opinions with precedential value.35 Intended couples in
these states are likely to be able to secure parental recognition
through an adoption proceeding that terminates the parental status of the birth mother where she consents to the proceeding after birth.
These approaches involve a series of trade-offs. States that
ban surrogacy outright to limit it to altruistic arrangements may,
in fact, limit use of surrogacy arrangements within their borders,
but they effectively lose the ability to oversee the activities of
their residents who go elsewhere to secure access to fertility services. Washington, for example, found that the result of its ban
on commercial surrogacy was that its residents often went elsewhere or used underground arrangements to access surrogacy
services.36 Like California, Washington now provides for recognition of the intended parents as legal parents if the parties comply with statutory provisions for a surrogacy agreement between
parties with independent legal representation.37 States, like Illinois, that combine protections for those who opt into state-specified procedures but strictly limit those who qualify for such
procedures, hope to entice residents into compliance. These jurisdictions depend on something of a tipping point. So long as
the majority of those who want such services comply with the
procedures, they help establish ethical, as well as legal norms, for
the treatment of such cases. On the other hand, if they exclude
large populations such as the LGBT community, members of
that group may find alternative approaches that undermine the
legal regime both ethically (labelling it unfair) and practically
(creating alternatives that different sex couples may also prefer).
Virginia, for example, attempted to regulate surrogacy following
See, e.g., In re Baby Boy A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (applying a choice of law clause referring to
Illinois law in the absence of applicable Minnesota law).
36 Lornett Turnbull, Bill Would Let Parents-to-be Pay Surrogates, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/billwould-let-parents-to-be-pay-surrogates/.
37 The woman acting as a surrogate and the intended parent or parents
must have independent legal representation throughout the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the surrogacy agreement and the potential legal
consequences of the agreement, and each counsel must be identified in the surrogacy agreement. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 6
§ 703(7) (S.S.B. 6037) (West).
35
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Baby M by adopting comprehensive legislation that required,
among other things, listing the identity of the gamete providers,
gestational carrier, and intended parents in public records. The
idea of public scrutiny discouraged compliance and almost no
one complied with the provisions, rendering them largely irrelevant to the development of surrogacy practice within the state.38
On the other hand, states with minimal or no regulation allow
the creation of flourishing surrogacy practices, but with little certainty about what will happen in the event of a dispute and little
public oversight or influence on the developing practices.39
C. Limits on Cross-Border Regulation
Individual states’ provisions rarely address fertility tourism
effectively and even those that purport to do so face intrinsic limitations because of constitutional requirements in the United
States, and practical ones elsewhere.
In American jurisdictions, the U.S. Constitution imposes
limits on the degree to which states can deny recognition of the
parental status of intended parents. Several decisions have invalidated provisions that refuse to grant parenthood to a woman
who has supplied her own egg to a gestational carrier with the
intention she retain parental status. A federal court, for instance,
declared a Utah statute unconstitutional in a case in which the
intended parents used their own gametes to conceive a child who
was carried to term by a gestational carrier.40 In that case, the
courts overturned Utah’s insistence that adoption was necessary
to recognize the genetic parents’ legal status. In a Florida case, a
women transferred an egg to her partner with the intention that
38 See Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New Paradigm for Family Law Decision-Making, 5 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 1, 62 (2003).
39 As the Iowa Supreme Court observed:
A majority of states lack statutes addressing surrogacy. As a result,
“cases often involve ad hoc procedures attempting to effectuate the
parties’ intent by analyzing surrogacy issues under the state’s statutes
for [termination of parental rights], adoption, custody and placement,
and the like.” Courts adjudicating disputes over the legality of surrogacy agreements in such states “are forced to confront issues of the
most difficult nature.”

P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Iowa 2018) (citations omitted).
40 J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296-1298 (D. Utah 2002).
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the two women would jointly raise the child. In this case, as well,
the Florida courts invalidated a statute that failed to recognize
the intended genetic mother as a legal parent.41 These decisions
limit the effectiveness of efforts to regulate surrogacy through insistence that the woman who gives birth is necessarily the legal
mother in all circumstances absent adoption or adoption-like
procedures.42
In addition, intended parents who arrange for the birth of a
child in another jurisdiction with friendlier surrogacy provisions
can ordinarily secure parentage there. In Berwick v. Wagner, for
example, a Texas couple married in Canada, registered as domestic partners in California, and arranged for a California gestational carrier to give birth to one of the two men’s biological son.
After the child’s birth, the couple secured a California declaration of parentage recognizing both men as legal parents. When
the couple, who lived in Texas, later separated, the biological father argued that the Texas courts should not recognize his partner as a legal parent. The Texas courts, however, found that the
California parentage declaration was entitled to full faith and
credit even though Texas could not have recognized the partner
as a parent under Texas law.43 Following Obergefell v. Hodges,44
the U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the states must grant
full faith and credit to out-of-state adoptions involving same-sex
couples.45 In V.L. v. E.L., a lesbian couple living in Alabama
temporarily moved to Georgia so that one of the women could
adopt the biological child of the other woman. When the parents
later separated, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the GeorT.M.H. v. D.M.T, 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). See also
Soos v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (finding that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by granting the intended father an opportunity to establish
legal parentage but denying that same chance to the intended mother).
42 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Art. 8 (2002), http://www.uniformlaws
.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf. Article 8 of the 2017 Uniform
Parentage Act has changed that provision, recognizing the parental status of
intended parents without adoption-like procedures.
43 See Jeffrey A. Parness, Choosing Among Imprecise American State Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. REV. 481, 495 (2015) (citing Berwick v. Wagner, No. 0112-00872-CV, 2014 WL 4493470 (Tex. App. Sept. 11, 2014)).
44 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
45 V. L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016).
41
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gia court lacked jurisdiction over adoption because the Alabama
court read the Georgia statute not to permit adoption by a second parent of the same-sex without terminating the parental
rights of the first mother. The Supreme Court held that statutory
construction of the Georgia adoption law was not a jurisdictional
issue, and that Alabama must give full fail and credit to the
Georgia adoption decree.46 This allows parents using a surrogate
to use a court order from the state where the child was born to
secure a parentage judgment, and then return home with an order that the courts of their home state must recognize.
Some European countries, which ban surrogacy outright or
recognize the woman giving birth as the mother, have attempted
to deny citizenship to children born to surrogates abroad. The
French, however, appear to have relented,47 and the British
courts, which adhere to a best interest of the child approach,
have generally recognized the parental status of the intended
parents even where the result appears to conflict with British
law.48 To do otherwise would effectively leave the child with no
legal parents, particularly where the commissioning parents used
anonymous gamete donors or foreign gestational carriers with no
continuing contact with the child.49 The German Supreme Court,
also recognizing the rights of the child, has similarly held that
Id.
In a case the attracted international attention, the French recognized
the parentage of a French couple who arranged for a child to be born to a
surrogate in the United States, but did not grant the child citizenship. See Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Apr. 6, 2011,
Bull. civ. I, No. 370 (Fr.), http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/370_6_ 19628.html. The European Court of Human
Rights, however, ruled that the French decision violated the rights of the child.
See Kirsty Oswald, France to Recognise Surrogate Children, BIONEWS (July 6,
2015), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_540529.asp.
48 See, e.g., L (A Minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam.), http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed74241 (recognizing intended British parents who
used a surrogate in Illinois as legal parents despite payments to the surrogate).
49 Id. In this case, the British intended father had provided sperm, the
gestational carrier had surrendered the child, and an American decision had
affirmed the British couples’ parentage. Between 2012 and 2016, the number of
parentage orders in surrogacy cases in England and Wales has almost doubled
and the government issued its first surrogacy guidance. See First Surrogacy
Guidance Issued in England and Wales, BBC (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.bbc
.com/news/health-43225867.
46
47
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Germany’s desire to discourage surrogacy was not a sufficient
reason to refuse to recognize the parentage of a same-sex couple
who were raising a child in Berlin born to a California surrogate
and subject to a California judgement confirming the two men’s
legal parenthood.50 While foreign countries do not necessarily
recognize American parentage judgments or adoption decrees,
they cannot effectively refuse to recognize the legal status of the
intended parents without harming the child.
These results do not just leave the home jurisdiction with no
way to enforce provisions outlawing surrogacy, limiting payment,
or prohibiting practices such as sex selection. They also leave
these jurisdictions with few ways to oversee the practices to prevent exploitative practices or protect children’s health and wellbeing. Effective solutions accordingly require thinking in different ways about regulations of the fertility business.
***
The ability to cross jurisdictional lines to access surrogacy
allows intended parents “to shop” for the legal regime that accommodates their preferences. Home jurisdictions have limited
ability to police their developments. Even surrogacy friendly jurisdictions stay that way by leaving many of the provisions in surrogacy contracts to the wishes of the parties.
As a practical matter, therefore, no jurisdiction comprehensively oversees the development of surrogacy practice. Instead,
private contracting shapes the parties’ understandings, and the
evolving norms underlying such agreements. Even states like
California, with supportive legislation, do not comprehensively
address the validity of contract terms. And some contract provisions, such as clauses dealing with abortion, are not subject to
specific enforcement anywhere (no woman may be compelled to
have an abortion against her will), but may trigger financial consequences of varying degrees of enforceability in the different
states. These practices influence the parties’ expectations about
their agreements as much, if not more, than formal legal
regulation.
50 German Supreme Court Recognizes Same-Sex Parents after Californian
Surrogacy, EUROPEAN SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www
.sexualorientationlaw.eu/102-german-supreme-court-recognizes-same-sex-parents-after-californian-surrogacy-germany.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\31-1\MAT101.txt

14

unknown

Seq: 14

24-SEP-18

14:18

Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers

In the face of the limited effectiveness of state regulation,
and wholesale ability to evade restrictive laws by traveling to a
different jurisdiction, it is time to consider a new approach – the
regulation of the professionals involved in the practice. Foremost among those professionals are the lawyers who draft surrogacy contracts.

II. Contracts as the Legal Structure for Both
Domestic and Cross-Border Surrogacy
Arrangements
Contracts provide the legal structure for surrogacy arrangements, whether they occur within a single jurisdiction or across
jurisdictional boundaries. This is true whether or not all of the
contract provisions are enforceable.51 In every jurisdiction, the
contracts shape the parties’ expectations about the transaction,
and serve as the default arrangements so long as no one contests
them.52 In jurisdictions without controlling statutes or precedent,
many courts defer to the contracts to establish the parties’ intentions and often a framework for decision-making.53 Contract
terms establish the basis for the surrogacy exchange – including
payment and provisions to secure the intended parents’ legal status, expectations about the conduct of the pregnancy, and governing documents to deal with the relationships not only between
In the vast majority of surrogacy transactions, things go smoothly in
accordance with the voluntary agreement of the parties. See Mark Hansen, As
Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA J. (Mar.
2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogacy_becomes_
more_popular_legal_problems_proliferate/.
52 In those jurisdictions that criminalize surrogacy arrangements or ban
commercial brokers, commercial agencies arranging such transactions may not
operate within the state. Even then, private arrangements may still take place,
and the parties may still look to contracts to structure their agreements. For an
example of such an arrangement involving a brother and sister in New York,
see Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with a Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?page
wanted=all.
53 See, e.g., P.M., 907 N.W.2d at 540 (holding gestational surrogacy agreements to be enforceable under existing Iowa law.); In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833
N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 2013)(presuming that it is in the child’s interest to enforce a surrogacy agreement even in traditional surrogacy cases).
51
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the prospective parents and the surrogate, but also with respect
to the agencies and others involved in the birth.
A. Establishing Parenthood
For intended parents, the most important parts of such a
contract are the provisions establishing parentage. These provisions can never be solely a matter of contract; that is, background
state law establishes principles that guide recognition of parental
status and contracts cannot unilaterally change these principles.
Nonetheless, surrogacy friendly jurisdictions establish ways to
recognize the intended parents’ legal status. California, for example, allows intended parents to petition for a judgment establishing their parental status before the child’s birth. Doing so
requires that the parents be a party to “a properly executed assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers” completed before the transfer of embryos to the gestational carrier
and comply with statutory provisions for independent counsel for
each party, notarization of the agreement, and the inclusion of
certain mandated provisions.54 Even in jurisdictions without explicit surrogacy recognition, contracts will typically require the
parties to comply with the steps necessary to establish the intended parents’ parentage. These steps may include, for example, surrender of the child to the intended parents at birth and
completion of the necessary paperwork for an adoption, if necessary to establish parentage.
In traditional surrogacy cases, however, where the birth
mother is genetically related to the child, many jurisdictions,
even those otherwise supportive of surrogacy agreements, will
uphold the birth mother’s parental status absent a voluntary relinquishment in the context of an adoption proceeding that gives
the mother an opportunity to change her mind after the child’s
birth.55 Even in these cases, however, where the mother has
54 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 466 (A.B. 1217) (West), codified at CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7962.
55 In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 837-40 (Tenn. 2014) (where a biological
surrogate mother refuses to consent to a parentage action, the only basis for
termination of rights is through the government by state statutes and not by the
contractual provisions). The California provisions cited above further provide
for recognition of the intended parents only in the gestational surrogacy cases.
See supra note 21.
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sought to retain her parental status, some courts have deferred to
the contract provisions in determining custody.56 The failure to
terminate the biological parent’s legal status in these cases would
nonetheless complicate recognition of the intended parents in another jurisdiction, should the intended parents chose to take the
child elsewhere.
In contrast, use of anonymous gametes creates different issues. Where the intended parents bear no genetic relationship to
the child, some jurisdictions require adoption to transfer
parenthood to the intended parents, and surrogacy contracts will
ordinarily provide for the gestational carrier’s voluntary relinquishment of any parental rights following birth as a step facilitating adoption or a parentage action by the intended parents.57
If the intended parents adopt in the jurisdiction in which the
child is born, the adoption will sever the parental status of the
surrogate and the gamete donors. If the adoptive parents then
take the child to another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction will have
no basis on which to recognize anyone else as legal parents.58
The only practical solutions will to be accept the adoptive parents’ legal status or to place the child in foster care.59

See F.T.R. 833 N.W.2d at 651 (finding a traditional surrogate to be a
legal parent, but finding that contract provisions granting the biological father’s
custody are to be accorded a presumption that they are in the child’s best
interests).
57 See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011) (involving a
gestational agreement under which the surrogate mother agreed to “terminate
her putative parental rights and to consent to adoption of any resulting children
by father’s domestic partner.”).
58 For a discussion of bringing children born abroad into the United
States, see State Recognition of Intercountry Adoptions Finalized Abroad,
Child Welfare Information Gateway, Children’s Bureau, https://www.childwel
fare.gov/pubpdfs/intercountry.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
59 The Italian courts have in fact removed a child born to a Russian surrogate, and placed the child in foster care rather than allow the Italian intended
parents, who born no genetic relationship to the child, to retain custody. The
European Court of Human Rights, however, condemned the action. Italy
Wrong to Take Child Born to Surrogate: ECHR, Local (Jan. 27, 2015), https://
www.thelocal.it/20150127/echr-italy-wrong-to-take-child-born-to-russian-surro
gate.
56
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B. Payment
From the gestational carrier’s perspective, payment is a critical aspect of the surrogacy transaction. Well-drafted agreements
typically require that the intended parties make payments in advance.60 The agency may then distribute the payments to the surrogate in installments specified by the contract.61 The contract
provisions governing payment may be enforceable even if other
provisions of the contract are not. In addition, some contracts
insert a provision that permits the intended parents to stop financial payments to the carrier in the event she breaches a termination or other provision of the contract. Moreover, where the
intended parents and the gestational carrier reside in different
jurisdictions, the law that governs the financial terms of the contract may differ from the law that governs parentage.62
C. Agency Relationship
Often there are two or even three contracts involving the
parties, depending on whether a surrogacy agency is involved,
and whether the parties are utilizing the services of an independent escrow agent. Where an agency is involved, both the carrier
and intended parents typically sign separate agreements with the
agency, which may have a heightened duty of care to the intended parents and surrogate.63 The duty of care comes from the
nature of a relationship arranging for the birth of the child and
includes insuring that the surrogate meets medical and psychological criteria. Even where the attorney is acting solely through
an agency or matching service, the attorney, as an agency owner,
may accordingly have a duty to act in the client’s best interest in
providing non-legal services.
Carbone & Madeira, supra note 21, at 22.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (noting that
the surrogate was paid in installments over the course of the pregnancy, with
the final installment scheduled for six weeks after birth).
62 In J.F. 879 N.E.2d 740, for example, when a Pennsylvania trial court
ruled on the gestational carrier’s behalf, the intended father successfully sued in
Ohio to enforce other parts of the surrogacy agreement.
63 Susan L. Cronkin, Whose My Client? Recognizing and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in ART Law Representation, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 14, 16 (Fall 2011).
60
61
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D. Terms of the Pregnancy
Surrogacy contracts typically address many conditions that
might arise during the embryo transfer and potential pregnancy.64 Provisions in the contract may attempt to resolve controversial issues, such as the conditions under which the parties
agree to termination of the fetus in the event of a genetic abnormality or other contingencies.65 In addition, such contracts often
involve conduct during the pregnancy, including agreements not
to smoke, to have regular medical checkups, to avoid activities
that may injure the fetus, and other matters.66 The enforceability
of these provisions is questionable;67 yet, such clauses may help
establish the parties’ expectations.68 For example, many intended parents wish to be able to attend doctors’ appointments
and to view ultrasound images.69 In addition, given the potential
impact of smoking on the developing fetus, prospective parents
may wish to exclude from consideration a potential gestational
carrier who smokes. And pro-life prospective parents and carriers may wish to have an agreement ruling out abortion from the
beginning of the pregnancy. Discussions about such clauses may
help establish expectations about how to handle such matters
should they arise. They also help the parties find others who
share their own values and expectations.
E. Cross-jurisdictional Effects
Surrogacy contracts often create “facts on the ground” that
may make it difficult to challenge the results later. Challenges to
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements are relatively rare;
voluntary compliance is the norm.70 Moreover, when a conflict
occurs in a jurisdiction where the matter is one of first impresF.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644-45.
See generally Deborah L. Forman, Abortion Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts: Insights from a Case Study, 49 FAM. L.Q. 29 (Fall 2015).
66 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1260 (2013).
67 Forman, supra note 65, at 39-42.
68 Gestational carriers, for example, overwhelming indicate that they see
the abortion decision as one that should be made by the intended parents.
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 66.
69 The failure to agree on these provisions in advance can be a source of
tensions. See, e.g., P.M., 907 N.W.2d 522.
70 Id. See also Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 66, at 30-31.
64
65
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sion, courts often defer to the agreement in the absence of other
law. The American trend has been to enforce gestational carrier
agreements,71 although courts continue to struggle over specific
contractual issues.72
For jurisdictions that oppose surrogacy, the facts on the
ground create a dilemma. Surrogacy contracts often document
the violation of surrogacy laws outside the jurisdiction by providing evidence of the transaction, its commercial nature, and the
amount of payment. Many of these jurisdictions find some or all
of these factors to violate public policy.73 Where the jurisdiction
in which the surrogacy occurs severs the parental status of gamete donors or gestational carriers by operation of law or protects
their anonymity, this leaves the intended parents as the child’s
only possible legal parents. In the United Kingdom, for example,
which prohibits commercial surrogacy, the courts in a number of
surrogacy cases have ultimately recognized surrogacy arrangements that arguably violate UK law, but only after substantial
litigation and expense.74 For the intended parents, the result cre71 C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (surrogacy contracts are consistent with the public policy of California); P.M., 907
N.W.2d 522 (surrogacy contracts do not violate public policy of Iowa); In re
Baby Boy A, 2007 WL 4304448 *5-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (unpublished); J.F., 879 N.E.2d 740; In re Baby S, 128 A.3d 296 (Penn. Super. Ct.
2015); Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (holding that the Tennessee’s legislature’s failure to restrict surrogacy compels the conclusion that it is not against the state’s
public policy); F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 648-50 (the public policy of Wisconsin is
embodied in the “best interests of the child” standard, which supports enforcement of surrogacy agreements that create stability for the child).
72 Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783,795 (Conn. 2011) (assuming without
deciding that an agreement between Romanian intended parents and a Connecticut surrogate was valid in affirming that the intended parents were entitled
to a declaratory judgment of parentage); Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (generally enforcing an agreement but severing portions defining the status of the parties as
contrary to Tennessee state law); F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 634 (same result under
Wisconsin law).
73 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means if Necessary: The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy
Agreements, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 800 (2012).
74 Charles P. Kindregan & Danielle White, International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in Cross-Border Surrogacy Arrangements, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 527, 559-75 (2013) (describing
cases where UK courts granted parentage only after significant litigation and
uncertainty as to the result).
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ates a great deal of uncertainty about surrogacy outcomes, but
for the courts it creates a painful choice between the child’s interests, which ordinarily lie in recognition of the intended parents’
status, and upholding the law.75
Accordingly, lawyers advising clients with respect to surrogacy arrangements must be able to properly counsel their clients
with respect to the potentials risks that could arise if a dispute
were to arise and a court were to conclude that some or all of the
contract is not legally enforceable. With that in mind, we turn to
a review of the ethical rules most commonly encountered by
transactional lawyers in general, and then apply those rules to
representation of parties to both domestic and cross-border gestational carrier agreements.

IV. Professional Responsibilities
Given the role of contracts in structuring surrogacy transactions, the lawyers’ role is a critical one. Yet, attorneys’ ethical
obligations in contract drafting generally,76 much less in surrogacy contracts as a specialized field, have received relatively little
attention. The ethical framework that does exist tends to address
either the adversarial litigation context77 or specific issues such as
lawyers’ ethical obligations not to assist their clients in committing fraud or the duties owed to persons other than the lawyers’
own client.78 Other lawyers have defended the use of traditional
or form contract language, warning of the risks from unanticipated contractual interpretations and subsequent malpractice
claims.79 There is only minimal work evaluating issues in compe75 In the European Union, it also creates tensions between the rulings of
the European Court of Human Rights, which has adopted a best interest of the
child approach, and various national approaches that refuse to recognize the
citizenship of children born to surrogates abroad. Id. at 552 (noting that the
German government has refused to issue passports to children of German intended parents born to surrogates abroad).
76 See, e.g., Lisa L. Dahm, Practical Tips for Drafting Contracts and
Avoiding Legal Issues, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 89 (2014); Gregory M. Duhl, The
Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989 (2010); Lori D.
Johnson, The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting, 84 U. CIN. L. REV.
595 (2016).
77 Johnson, supra note 76, at 596-97.
78 Duhl, supra note 76, at 998-1001, 1004-1008, 1017-1019.
79 Dahm, supra note 76, at 96-97; Johnson, supra note 76, at 614-615.
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tence, client communication, conflicts of interest, fees, and other
“traditional” ethical issues that are more often evaluated in the
litigation context.
The importance of contracts in establishing the legal framework for surrogacy justifies a more systematic examination of attorney obligations. The ethical framework for surrogacy lawyers
will ordinarily come from the same principles that govern other
professional obligations. The surrogacy context, however, may
involve heightened ethical obligations where the attorney is in
effect shaping the practice in accordance with the attorney’s
rather than the client’s preferences. Even in dealing with sophisticated parties, the attorney’s duties may increase where the primary attorney role is to insure informed consent to the
agreement, particularly if the agreement includes provisions that
may not be legally enforceable, but that are important to the clients’ relationship to each other. Attorney obligations should also
become greater when the clients come from abroad or where
they have relatively little understanding of the process and of
their ability to negotiate surrogacy terms.80
In addition, lawyers may serve as gatekeepers. Intended
parents seeking to arrange a surrogacy transactions may involve
lawyers as go-betweens who help identify surrogacy agencies, as
brokers who help recruit gestational carriers, gamete donors or
other participants, as advisers who help navigate the process of
negotiating a contract or establishing parenthood, or as guarantors who put their personal imprimatur on the legitimacy or validity of the arrangement. These roles may help guard against
surrogacy abuses, but they also raise questions about potential
conflicts of interest or heightened duties to communicate effectively with clients.
In each of the sections below, we start with assessment of
traditional ethical considerations as they apply in the surrogacy
context, then address issues particular to surrogacy transactions,
and finish with an examination of how interested jurisdictions
might strengthen the process.

In re Totten, 993 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (disciplining
a criminal attorney who represented limited English proficiency clients in a real
estate transaction).
80
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A. Competence and the Creation of a Surrogacy Bar
Participants in the surrogacy process often look to attorneys
for the same type of legal advice lawyers provide in other circumstances. They may also look to attorneys, however, as guarantors
of the legitimacy of the process. This role is a trickier one for a
lawyers. It involves negotiating what in many jurisdictions is an
uncertain process for securing legal recognition of the intended
parents’ parental status. Moreover, it may require anticipating
not only the legal requirements in the jurisdiction in which the
surrogate gives birth, but the legal requirements for establishing
parenthood in the intended parents’ home jurisdiction.
In negotiating legal uncertainty, the most basic issue is competence. In jurisdictions with relatively little law governing surrogacy agreements, competence may involve not just knowledge
of the law but an understanding of how individual judges in the
jurisdiction approach surrogacy matters. This may be a function
of local experience and networks.81 Legal ratification of
parenthood, whether through a judicial declaration of parentage
or an adoption proceeding, is often faster, more certain, and less
expensive when the judge has experience with surrogacy cases
and is supportive of the transaction.82 While the assignment of
judges is sometimes unpredictable,83 experienced lawyers may be
better able to insure that cases come before such judges, particularly where the action is uncontested.
The basic rules of professional responsibility require competence to represent the client with respect to the specific matters
for which she is being retained. ABA Model Rule 1.1 defines
competence as “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
81 Securing legal recognition for LGBT clients has long involved using
networks to identify judges supportive of the clients’ families. See, e.g.,
AMANDA K. BAUMLE & D’LANE R. COMPTON, LEGALIZING LGBT FAMILIES:
HOW THE LAW SHAPES PARENTHOOD 178 (2017) (describing use of attorneys or
personal professional networks to insure that adoption proceedings are brought
before the right judge). For an example of how a judge skeptical of surrogacy
can affected an otherwise uncontested parentage determination, see In re Paternity of J. W. O. T., 900 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017), review denied sub
nom. R. B. O. v. Knutson, 905 N.W.2d 840 (Wis. 2017).
82 BAUMLE & COMPTON, supra note 81, at 178 (discussing the role of individual judges in the speed of adoption proceedings).
83 See, e.g., J. W. O. T., 900 N.W.2d 344.
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preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”84
Competence includes the knowledge and ability to review all relevant documents to the transaction and to properly advise the
client as to whether the documents are sufficient to comply with
the law and achieve the clients’ needs.85 A lawyer representing
an unsophisticated client in a transaction may have a heightened
duty to understand the nature and risks of the transaction in order to be able to effectively communicate these risks to the client.86 Lack of experience in a specialized area of the law may
give rise to questions of competence.87
Mere neglect often does not rise to a violation of Rule 1.1
(although it may violate other rules), but an attorney must act in
a reasonable manner given the complexity and nature of the representation.88 “Rule 1.1 mandates that a general practitioner
must identify areas in which the lawyer is not competent and acquire sufficient knowledge about the specific area of law in which
the lawyer is practicing in order to avoid harm to the client.”89
While a lawyer who is new to a field may be just as competent as
an experienced lawyer, an attorney who has not practiced in a
specific field previously must ensure that she is keenly aware of
all relevant law and procedure.90 Further, a lawyer may need to
disclose her lack of experience to the client.91
At the outset, a lawyer practicing assisted reproductive technology law must have a good working knowledge of the medical
procedures and terminology involved in surrogacy, without
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2016).
See In re Goldstein, 990 A.2d 404 (Del. 2010) (disciplining attorney
who failed to properly review a contract under Rules 1.1 and 1.4).
86 In re Totten, 993 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (disciplining
a criminal attorney who represented limited English proficiency clients in a real
estate transaction).
87 Id.
88 Iowa Sup. Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857 N.W.2d 195,
205 (Iowa 2014) but see In re Owen, 306 P.3d 452, 455 (N.M. 2013) (inaction can
lead to finding of a lack of competence).
89 In re Richmond’s Case, 872 A.2d 1023, 1028 (N.H. 2005).
90 Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Narasimhan, 92 A.3d 512,
519 (Md. Ct. App. 2014)
91 Id. at 531 (concluding that a lawyer violated Rule 8.4 by misrepresenting her level of experience in addition to demonstrating a lack of competence
under Rule 1.1).
84
85
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which a lawyer cannot competently draft a surrogacy contract.92
For example, a lawyer must generally understand the types of
medical testing and screening that should be done prior to the
transfer in order to craft accurate representations and warranties
in any agreement. The lawyer must also understand the nature
and consequences of different transfer protocols to be able to
anticipate potential health risks that may affect the parties.93
And given the increasing emphasis on identifying the source of
medical payments as part of the surrogacy agreement, a lawyer
should be able to determine whether the parties’ existing health
insurance covers the surrogates’ health care costs, which can be
an uncertain and contentious issue in itself.94 This is only a small
example of the extensive background information a surrogacy
lawyer might need to possess to avoid drafting issues.
The problem in surrogacy cases, particularly in a jurisdiction
with relatively little law, is that contract drafting often reflects
lawyers’ knowledge of the things that can go wrong. Surrogacy
contracts tend to be lengthy in large part because lawyers try to
anticipate the full range of complexities that could occur, and to
provide for such eventualities in the agreement.95 In contrast,
state-prescribed form agreements are much shorter.96 The law92 See Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, et al. The International Glossary on
Infertility and Fertility Care, 32 HUM. REPRODUCTION 1786 (2017).
93 While an attorney may not be held responsible for advising a client on
the risks that come with higher order births, for example, an experienced attorney may want to insure that the clients have been advised about the risks both
to the fetuses and the gestational carrier if the parties contemplate transferring
multiple embryos. See, e.g., Nancy S. Green, Risks of Birth Defects and Other
Adverse Outcomes Associated with Assisted Reproductive Technology, 114 PEDIATRICS 256 (2004).
94 See, e.g, Debra E. Guston & William Singer, A Well-Planned Family
How LGBT People Don’t Have Children by Accident, N.J. LAW., June 2013, at
36 (“Participants in the use of ART also must deal with insurance coverage
regulations.”).
95 In a contested case involving selection reduction of triplets, for example, the surrogate indicated that the surrogacy agreement was 75 pages long.
Michelle Goldberg, Is a Surrogate a Mother?, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www
.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/custody_case_over_triplets_in_cali
fornia_raises_questions_about_surrogacy.html.
96 See, e.g., 2 CALIFORNIA TRANSACTIONS FORMS: FAMILY LAW § 7:45
(1998) (artificial insemination surrogacy agreement between an intended father
and a surrogate couple).
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yer for the intended parents typically drafts the agreement, and
these attorneys have a particular duty to be prepared to advise
the client how a contract can protect their position. Lawyers for
the surrogate, as we will discuss below, need to be in a position to
explain lengthy proposed agreements to their clients.97
Competence issues can also arise in representing foreign clients in a transactional matter. One can easily imagine a situation
in which a foreign national would inquire about the effect of the
transaction or enforcement of a provision of a contract in the
client’s own country. In Europe, recognition may involve not
only that country’s parentage laws, but European Union human
rights provisions.98 Accordingly, it may be necessary to consult
with or advise the client to retain a lawyer in her own country to
provide competent advice on these issues. The ability of the intended parents to receive recognition in their home jurisdiction
may also depend on the provisions of the contract. In jurisdictions that ban commercial payment, for example, it may help to
characterize payments as compensation for loss of work, discomfort and inconvenience, or other matters.99 Within the United
States, it may be important to secure a court order before the
child leaves the jurisdiction given the fact that such an order will
be entitled to full faith and credit in all U.S. jurisdictions.100
A number of state bars have certification programs that
grant attorneys recognition as specialists in a given field.101 Cali97 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 95, indicating that the in contested California case, the gestational carrier gave the 75 page agreement only a cursory
reading, and was not aware of the provision addressing selection reduction.
98 See, e.g, Oswald, supra note 47.
99 For a discussion of the role of compensation, for example, under U.K.
law, see Re L (A Minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam); Re S (Parental Order)[2009] EWHC 2977 (Fam). See also Emily Jackson, Jenni Millbank, Isabel
Karpin & Anita Stuhmcke, Learning from Cross-Border Reproduction, 25 MED.
L. REV. 23, 29 (2017) (describing how Canadian payments are acceptable in
Australia because they are described as reimbursement for expenses).
100 Such orders can only be challenged on jurisdictional grounds, which
also makes it important to insure that parties have complied with the jurisdictional requirements necessary to grant the order. See V. L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct.
1017.
101 See, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Sources of Certification, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/specialization/resources/resources_for_lawyers/sources_of_
certification.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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fornia, for example, certifies family law specialists, who must pass
a written exam in the specialty area and have been in practice
“for at least five years, spending at least 25 percent of the time
given to occupational endeavors practicing in the specialty
area.”102 To insure competence and public confidence in surrogacy lawyers, a state requiring legal representation could require
representation by such a certified family law specialist. Alternatively, brokers or travel agencies arranging representation for
their client could use such certifications as part of their efforts to
insure competent representation. There is a clear need for a surrogacy practice group to develop a specialty certification program that could be accredited by the American Bar Association,
and whose members agree to abide by the ABA’s ethical
guidelines.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Many clients, particularly those coming from outside the jurisdiction, may look to attorneys not just for legal advice, but for
assurances about the probity of the surrogacy agency or the reliability of the gestational carrier herself. Many attorneys will view
a request for such assurances as outside the scope of legal representation and should so inform the client. Experienced attorneys, however, may interact on a regular basis with IVF centers,
surrogacy clinics, and brokers who recruit gamete donors. It is
therefore not surprising that the best practices for doctors
adopted by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine require that both the intended parents and carrier have ongoing
independent legal representation by an “appropriate legal practitioner who is experienced with gestational carrier contracts.”103
These attorneys will fall into two categories raising the question
of potential conflicts and ethical responsibilities.
First, some attorneys run surrogacy or gamete donor agencies. Having a licensed professional run such agencies may
encourage greater confidence in the agency. Licensed profes102 State Bar of California, Legal Specialization, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Attorneys/Legal-Specialization (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
103 Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine and Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology, Recommendations for Practices Utilizing Gestational Carriers: A
Committee Opinion, 103 FERTILITY & STERILITY E1, E4-5 (2014).
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sionals, after all, can be expected to have greater knowledge
about the underlying legal requirements, and they can have more
to lose – their professional licenses – in the event of fraud or
abusive conduct. In addition, lawyers who both run agencies and
oversee contracts and other legal documentation may be able to
reduce the costs to intended parents.
Second, attorneys often develop less formal relationships
with such agencies. They may handle legal work for the agency
on a regular basis, or regard the agency as a regular source of
referrals for clients seeking legal representation in entering into
surrogacy contracts. In these cases, the attorneys can be expected to acquire information about the agency’s procedures and
reliability.
In both cases, the closer the attorney’s relationship with a
particular agency, the greater the potential for conflicts of interest.104 These conflicts are clearly the greatest if an attorney is
also running a surrogacy agency or recruiting gamete donors.
Even attorneys who simply receive referrals on a regular basis
from certain agencies may have a conflict, however; attorneys
who complicate the contracting process by raising objections or
adding custom-crafted terms to protect individual clients may
find that their referrals disappear. In addition, while attorneys
who know less about the operation of such agencies will ordinarily have fewer potential conflicts of interest, the question arises
about whether they should have a duty to inquire into the reliability of the agency if they are in a position to do so. The more
that attorneys became gatekeepers, referring clients to particular
agencies, increasing the likelihood that contracts will be viewed
as enforceable because of their representation, or reassuring clients about the reliability of the surrogacy process, the greater
their obligations should be.
We start with the most difficult of the scenarios: attorneys
who personally own or oversee a surrogacy agency, then discuss
the role of referrals in creating conflicts in the following section
on fees.
104 See, e.g., In re Conduct of Spencer, 330 P.3d 538, 543 (Or. 2014) (serving as the client’s real estate broker while representing the client in a bankruptcy was both a business transaction and an adverse pecuniary interest falling
under Rule 1.8).
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Attorneys who both own agencies and oversee legal representation of intended parents start with an intrinsic conflict of
interest. Agencies earn their income by matching prospective
parents with surrogates and gamete donors. As agency owners,
they accordingly have an interest in having the transaction go
through, and in seeking to seek to allay the concerns potential
customers may have about the process. Lawyers, in contrast,
generally advise clients about what can go wrong, and how to
position themselves to deal with potential problems. Simply raising the issues may persuade clients not to go ahead with a transaction. In addition, giving the client accurate information may
involve calling attention to contract provisions, such as provisions dealing with a carrier’s promise not to smoke, that may be
effectively unenforceable. Because these conflicts are inevitable,
it is possible to argue that attorneys should not both own agencies and provide legal advice to the agency’s clients.105 In this
section, we remain agnostic, evaluating the pros and cons of the
different approaches, but maintaining that the greater the conflicts, the greater the attorney obligations become to inform the
client and to insure that the client’s interests are protected.

105 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2016) (providing that
unless the conflicts can be and are waived, a lawyer may not represent two
clients whose interests are materially adverse to each other or where there is a
significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent one client will be limited by
her duties to another client, a former or prospective client, another person, or
the lawyer’s own interests).
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1. Ethical obligations for attorneys who own surrogacy
agencies
Rule 1.8106 applies to business transactions related or unrelated to the representation.107 “The commentary to ABA Rule
1.8(a) establishes that the first part of that rule serves as a general prophylactic against lawyers entering into business transactions with clients.”108 Further, the lawyer has an adverse
pecuniary interest any time her interest might be financially opposed to that of the clients.109 Thus, a lawyer who benefits from
the successful negotiation of a contract in which the lawyer represents a client has an adverse pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the matter and must strictly comply with Rule 1.8(a).
Several courts have held that a lawyer must comply with
Rule 1.8(a) when the lawyer simultaneously represents the client
and is involved in offering the client a non-legal product or service, regardless of whether the product or service is related to the
representation.110 Such a duty is heightened, and severe sanctions have been imposed where a lawyer obtains a personal financial benefit for the outcome of a transaction without making
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2016) provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood
by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client,
to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in
the transaction.

106

Spencer, 330 P.3d at 543.
Id. at 542.
109 In re Fisher, 202 P.3d 1186, 1196 (Colo. 2009) (holding that a lawyer
who received a security interest in a client’s property without complying with
waiver requirements violated Rule 1.8).
110 Florida Bar v. Doherty, 94 So.3d 443 (Fla. 2012) (disbarring a lawyer
who sold securities to a client without complying with Rule 1.8(a)); Spencer, 330
P.3d at 54.
107
108
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adequate disclosures and complying with Rule 1.8(a). In disbarring a lawyer who represented a client in estate planning while
simultaneously selling the client securities, the Florida Supreme
Court held:
The evidence demonstrates that Doherty’s conduct created a clear
conflict of interest in that there was a substantial risk that his representation of the client would be limited by his own interests. Doherty
acted purposefully to make his personal, pecuniary interests at least as
important as those of his client and her estate. He advised his client to
select various means of estate planning and wealth management that
would earn him a personal financial benefit. Additionally, Doherty
participated in a business transaction with his client and failed to disclose his substantial interest in the transaction. We believe his actions
amount to egregious misconduct.111

If the lawyer has any interest in the transaction, Rule 1.7,
including the informed consent waiver provisions, applies. A
lawyer engaging in a business transaction with his own client or
holding an adverse pecuniary interest must obtain enhanced informed consent to waive the conflict, including a disclosure of
how the lawyer may benefit by consummation of the transaction
and the lawyer’s precise role.112 The client must be advised by
the lawyer of the desirability of having the transactions reviewed
by independent outside counsel, and must be given a reasonable
opportunity to do so.113
2. Establishing the attorney-agency-client relationship
The intended parents, surrogates, and gamete donors will ordinarily initiate contact with the surrogacy agency.114 At this initial stage, there will be no attorney-client relationship and,
indeed, the parties may not be thinking about or seeking formal
legal representation. A potential agency customer, particularly
one aware that a lawyer runs the agency, may nonetheless rely on
the agency’s brochures, oral representations, website, or written
information in making decisions about legal matters.
Lawyers have a duty under Rules 4.1 and 4.3 to avoid making misstatements, as well as the duty to make reasonable efforts
Doherty, 94 So.3d at 450.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(3) (2016).
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(2) (2016).
114 The ethics of an attorney referring a client to his own surrogacy agency
may raise a different set of issues outside the scope of this article.
111
112
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to ensure that their non-lawyer assistants (staff) avoid such statements as well under Rule 5.3(a). Where a lawyer runs an agency,
these obligations may extend to the agency even if the attorney
does not personally speak to or represent the interested parties.
Attorneys should keep in mind that at the intake stage, the
clients are unrepresented by counsel and have interests that are
adverse to the owners or managers of the agency. Therefore,
lawyers who own, manage, or work directly for agencies or have
affiliates who perform such matching services need to ensure that
their agency client intake procedures, including training for nonlawyer assistants, are robust and avoid the possibility that any
material misstatements will be made during the initial intake and
promotion of the agency’s services. The risk of misinformation
needs to take into account the potential inexperience or naiveté
of potential agency customers.
Once the interested parties decide to enter into a relationship with the surrogacy agency, the next step typically involves
signing a contract between the agency and the intended parents,
gestational carrier, or gamete donors. These documents typically
involve the payment of fees (particularly from the intended parents to the agency) or provisions for medical or psychological
testing (particularly from prospective donors or surrogates). A
lawyer who owns such an agency may wish to draft these contracts. In this case, the lawyer’s client is the agency itself,115 a
party whose interests are adverse to those of the other signatories to such agreements.116
The agency and its attorney owners can protect themselves
by counseling the agency customer117 to obtain independent legal
representation to avoid potential conflicts under Rule 1.8(a)(2).
If the customer declines to do so, the agency should have the
Any potential conflicts between the attorney and the agency are beyond the scope of this article.
116 In fact, similar concerns underlie the formation of the attorney-client
relationship, and the rules of professional conduct consider this by limiting the
ability of the lawyer to insert certain provisions into an engagement agreement
without enhanced disclosure. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8, cmt.
14 (2016); see also Snow v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., 176 A.3d
729, 734-37 (Me. 2017).
117 At this stage, the intended parents, potential gestational carriers and
gamete donors have no legal representation and are therefore not “clients.”
We use the term “customer” here to avoid confusion.
115
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customer sign a statement indicating that the agency advised her
to seek independent legal representation and the client decided
not to do so.118 If the lawyer or agency or its affiliates are likely
to represent the customer in an attorney-client relationship during the surrogacy process, the attorney will be required to insure
that the transaction is fair and reasonable to the client.119
Further, the agency should explain critical parts of the contractual agreement to its customers. Some agencies, for example,
will restrict the amount intended parents can pay a donor or surrogate, and these terms may restrict the intended parents’ ability
to find donors of their choice.120 The customers may not understand the implications of these agreements at the time they are
signed, particularly where the agreement restricts the terms that
will apply to later agreements, agreements where the attorney
may then be representing the agency customer.
3. Negotiating an agreement between intended parents and
a gestational carrier
The greatest potential for conflicts exists when a lawyer who
owns an agency also represents the intended parents in drafting
contracts with surrogates or gamete donors.121 Typically, an attorney-owner establishes an attorney-client relationship with intended parents only after the clients have signed a contract with
the agency, which will typically mean that the intended parents
have made a decision to go ahead with the process. In addition,
the agency is not necessarily a party to the agreement between
The agency should obtain confirmation of the waiver of the right to an
independent counsel in writing. This writing should include a statement that
the customer was counseled to obtain independent review of the agreement,
and a detailed explanation of the disclosures made by the agency, including
whether a lawyer affiliated with the agency participated at all in preparing or
reviewing the agency agreement with the customer.
119 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(1) (2016).
120 Intended parents, for example, may find it more difficult to recruit East
Asian or Jewish egg donors without paying higher prices. Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 203, 222 (2009).
121 The conflicts of interest are sufficiently apparent that an attorney who
owns an agency should not also represent surrogates or gamete donors either in
entering into a contract with the agency, or in entering into a contract with the
intended parents.
118
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the intended parents and the surrogate or donors. In this context, the agency and the intended parents both have an interest in
having the surrogacy transaction occur, and both have an interest
in positioning the intended parents to secure legal recognition of
their parental status. In addition, lawyers in such cases will ordinarily propose use of a standard agreement (albeit one drafted
by the individual attorney) rather than a custom-negotiated
one.122 Nonetheless, conflicts clearly exist.
ABA Model Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.18 govern a number of
possible conflicts. The most basic involves the lawyers’ interest
in having the contract go through, a circumstance that clearly involves a conflict.123 Since the agency has a vested interest often
backed by a financial incentive to ensure that the contracting
process is completed, lawyers who own or are affiliated with the
agency may have their professional judgment, including their absolute duty of loyalty to their client, impaired. They may be
tempted, for example, to minimize the legal uncertainties associated with the process or problems with the enforceability of certain contract clauses important to the intended parents.
Moreover, if, as we suggest below, the best way to insure against
later problems is to have intended parents and surrogates thoroughly discussion issues such as abortion, birth defects, or behavior during pregnancy in advance, lawyers may be hesitant to do
so where they have an interest in insuring that the parties reach
agreement. And a lawyer who owns an agency may be reluctant
to question the client’s agency agreement, if that agreement later
proves to the client’s disadvantage. Even if the agency is not a
direct party to a surrogacy contract, it may have independent
contractual obligations to all of the parties involved in the agreement, and a direct interest in the outcome and the details of such
an agreement.

122 See, e.g., Ellen Trachman, I Want to Put a Baby in You: Triplets
Trouble, ABOVE THE LAW (May 2, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/03/iwant-to-put-a-baby-in-you-triplets-trouble/ (describing a surrogate’s failure to
review the contract, even with legal representation).
123 Rule 1.7(a)(2) refers to “a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2016).
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A lawyer who owns an agency therefore intrinsically has a
conflict of interest in such circumstances. The question then becomes whether the conflict is waivable, and if so, how an attorney
can minimize potential liability. Conflicts are typically imputed
to all members of a lawyer’s firm; accordingly, a waiver is needed
even if the attorney providing individual representation is simply
a member of the same firm as the attorney who owns the
agency.124
A conflict of interest can be waived generally only where the
parties give written informed consent and the lawyer has a reasonable belief that she can diligently and competently complete
the representation despite the concurrent conflict.125 Analyzing
whether the attorney can diligently and competently complete
the representation requires an analysis of several factors and disclosures related to these factors in the waiver.
One issue is whether the attorney is representing more than
one party at a time. As we argued above, agencies should keep
the attorney role in preparing the customer’s contract with the
agency separate from the attorney’s role in negotiating a later
surrogacy agreement with a surrogate or gamete donors. The attorney should also not represent both the intended parents and
either the surrogate or gamete donors.126 The attorney will still,
however, have potential conflicts of interests and should inform
the client of those conflicts, and advise the client that if a potential dispute arises with the agency, the client should expect to get
separate representation to handle that matter.
Another issue is the attorney’s willingness to consider
changes to the surrogacy agreement. Given that the attorney is
likely to have personally drafted the agreement and to have used
it in other transactions, the attorney may be reluctant to consider
changes, whether or not conflicts of interest exist. If this is the
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2016).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(c). It is unlikely in a transactional representation that the dual representation would be prohibited by
law, barring waiver under Rule 1.7(c)(2). Further, Rule 1.7(c)(3) is plainly not
applicable to transactional representations.
126 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 7. See also Van Kirk v.
Miller, 869 N.E.2d 534, 542-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a lawyer retained for the purpose of memorializing a contract already negotiated had a
conflict that was waivable, but that the analysis would be different if the contract terms had not already been negotiated).
124
125
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case, the attorney may want to inform the client at the outset that
this is true. In addition, to the extent that the agency may insist
on certain contractual provisions, the attorney should explain
what those provisions are and their implications at the time that
the waiver is signed.
A sophisticated client is much more likely to appreciate the
effect of a waiver than an unsophisticated client. Consequently,
“the more experienced the client is in legal matters generally and
in making decisions of the type involved, the less information
and explanation is needed for a client’s consent to be informed.”127 Conversely, a lawyer who is not convinced that her
client appreciates or understands the effects of a waiver cannot
be sure the client is giving informed consent and cannot reasonably proceed with the joint representation.
4. Dealings with third parties such as surrogate and gamete
donors
Attorneys and agencies will ordinarily advise the intended
parents to pay for an attorney to represent surrogates because
the validity and fairness of the surrogacy agreement may be important to the intended parents’ ability to secure recognition of
their status as legal parents. Intended parents may be more reluctant to also pay for attorneys to represent gamete donors, and
the donors may not be represented by attorneys at all.128 In
these cases, the donors may rely on an agency’s lawyer’s statements without realizing that the lawyer is representing the intended parents. The lawyer, in that case, will have an obligation
to avoid potential misunderstandings and misstatements for the
same reasons described above.
127 Galderma Lab., L.P., v. Actavis Mid Atlantic, LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d
390, 397 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct R.
1.0 cmt. 6 (2010)).
128 Many professional organizations, including the American Academy of
Assisted Reproductive Technology Attorneys (AAARTA), caution against permitting parties to go unrepresented in connection with an assisted reproductive
contract. See AAARTA, Code of Ethics § 16(a), http://www.aaarta.org/aaarta/
academy-info/ethics-code (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). Of course, the lawyer cannot force his client to agree to reimburse the other side’s costs but she can
advise the client that it is industry standard and likely in the client’s own best
interests to do so.
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Where a client manifests that she doesn’t understand the implications of the attorney’s conflict of interest with the agency,
such as asking the lawyer for advice on whether the client should
try to renegotiate her contract with the agency, the lawyer should
question whether the client has given informed consent and
should decline or terminate the representation.
C. Professional Judgment and Fee Issues
There are several potential fee issues that can arise when
representing unsophisticated clients in transactional matters.
Common problems include avoiding conflicts where fees are paid
by the other party or a third party. Further, lawyers who use flat
fees must ensure that the overall fee is reasonable and that they
comply with rules preventing comingling and ensure that fees are
treated properly until they are permissibly deemed earned.
If the client’s fees are to be paid by another party, including
the opposing side to a transaction, a lawyer must be mindful of
her ethical obligations under Model Rule 5.4 and comply with
the requirements of Model Rule 1.8(f). Under Rule 5.4(c), a lawyer may not permit a party who pays the lawyer’s fees or recommends the lawyer to in any way influence or direct the
professional judgment of the lawyer in rendering the services.
Rule 5.4(c) completely bars the lawyer from considering or entertaining any input regarding the representation from a non-client payor of her fees.129
Where a lawyer accepts a representation paid for by a party
other than her client, the lawyer must comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(f). First, the lawyer must reasonably determine that there will be no interference with the lawyer’s exercise
of professional judgment or the attorney-client relationship.130
This includes insuring that the payor does not maintain supervision of the representation and the payor cannot impose conditions on the lawyer’s handling of the matter.131 The attorney
must ensure that all parties understand that the attorney-client
privilege will apply and that payment by another party does not
See In re Rumsey, 71 P.3d 1150, 1162 (Kan. 2003).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2016)
131 In re Rules of Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules
and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 815 (Mont. 2000).
129
130
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constitute a waiver of the privilege.132 The client must give informed consent, which must include a discussion of the potential
risks in receiving payment from a third party.133
Attorneys who review surrogacy contracts have two potential ethical conflicts. First, if they agree to representation in accordance with a flat fee,134 they may not be paid if they withdraw
before a contract is signed. A split of authority exists on whether
a lawyer can retain any portion of the flat fee for work performed if the representation is not completed.135
Second, even if retention of the flat fee is not tied to the
client’s signing of the contract, attorneys who question contract
provisions, try to renegotiate them, or give advice that persuades
the client not to sign are likely to see their referrals decrease.
While these attorneys do not have the formal conflicts of interest
that agency lawyers who own the agencies have, they also have
incentives to not to advise clients in ways that make it less likely
that the clients will participate in surrogacy arrangements. A
lawyer, for example, could discourage a client’s participation in
the process simply by providing a full explanation of what the
contract entails.
D. Communications
Communication is key when representing a client in a transactional matter. It is even more important when a lawyer is representing an unsophisticated client in a complex negotiation or
contractual matter and where the client may be a foreign national with minimal exposure to the American legal system. In
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(3).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(1).
134 In re Kendall, 804 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Ind. 2004) (noting that as of 2002,
the ABA Commission on Billable Hours reported that 51% of all transaction
work was billed on a flat fee basis and flat fees were commonly used by solo or
small firms). It is likely that the use of flat fees has only increased. See Robert
E. Hirshon, The Billable Hour Is Dead. Long Live . . .?, 30 GPSOLO (Jan./Feb.
2013), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2013/january_februa
ry/billable_hour_dead_long_live.html.
135 Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers, 967 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ohio
2012) (holding that an attorney who withdrew before completion of case was
not entitled to hourly recovery), with Matter of Gilbert, 346 P.3d 1018, 1023-27
(Colo. 2015) (deciding that an attorney was entitled to quantum meruit recovery where terminated by a client).
132
133
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the surrogacy context, communications are particularly important because the lawyer must communicate about the fact that, in
most jurisdictions, the law is uncertain, important parts of the
contract are unenforceable but still important to the parties, and
to a large degree the process depends on the voluntary compliance of the parties.136
Model Rule 1.4 governs communications between the lawyer and her own client.137 Specifically relevant to transactional
matters are the duties of the attorney to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter,138 and the duty to
explain to the client relevant information about the matter in a
way that permits the client to make informed decisions about
how to proceed.139 In the surrogacy context, this raises the question of whether an attorney who owns an agency can be charged
with knowledge of information available to the agency. For example, if the agency discovers information in the context of
screening a potential donor or gestational carrier, would the attorney-owner be charged with knowledge of that information?
Would the lawyer’s duty to disclose such information be different
from the agency’s duty to disclose such information?140 The answer depends on separating the agency obligation to the client,
which is a matter of contract between the agency and the intended parents and may limit the information the agency agrees
to provide,141 from the attorney’s obligation. The obligation of
the attorney to the client will ordinarily be greater, and if the
attorney and the agency wish to restrict the information pro136 Cross-border transactions may involve even greater uncertainty. See,
e.g,. Jackson, et al, supra note 93, 33-36 (describing attitudes of Australians who
use surrogacy abroad, recognizing that the contracts are unenforceable, but expecting to be able to receive recognition as parents). Jackson, et al described
the process “as one of law and not-law. Id. at 34.
137 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2016).
138 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3).
139 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b).
140 See, e,g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the
Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 90 (2007) (observing that
agency screening indicated that the surrogate mother in the Baby M case, Mary
Beth Whitehead, would have difficulty giving up the baby, but the agency ignored the information).
141 The agency of course still has various duties such as a duty not to mislead the customer about the information it has in its files.
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vided, it should state so expressly not only in the agency agreement but in the attorney-client retention and waiver
agreements.142
Misrepresentations to the client clearly violate Rule 1.4.143
Where a client expresses that she is confused about a term or
condition, or that she doesn’t understand the effect of a decision
or outcome, the lawyer has a duty to explain further so that the
client can make informed decisions.144 The explanation must be
presented at a level (and in a language) that the client can understand, taking the client’s background into account. For example,
the lawyer may have an obligation to explain to foreign residents
that securing a parentage order in the United States does not
guarantee recognition of parentage or citizenship in other
countries.145
A lawyer must promptly notify the client about significant
developments affecting the representation.146 Undoubtedly, this
includes promptly notifying the client about the rejection of a
contract offer and the receipt of a contractual counter-offer with
changes to the client’s original offer in the form of a redlined
document. The prudent lawyer should always timely advise the
client about all communications received from the other side to a
matter, even if the lawyer advises the client that no response to
142 In the case of a gestational carrier who fled to Michigan rather than
have an abortion, the carrier reported that the only screening done by the
agency was done over the phone. CRYSTAL KELLEY & ELIZABETH COLLINS,
FIRE WITHIN: A SURROGATE’S JOURNEY 70-71 (Taylor Street Publishing LLC
2014). The interview produced information that should have constituted a red
flag, but there was no exploration of the carrier’s willingness to abort in accordance with the information in the surrogacy contract. These practices depart
from the norm, involve a screener with a clear conflict of interest, and indicate a
failure to inquire about Kelley’s views on abortion. Forman, supra note 65, at
51.
143 Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Steinberg, 910 A.2d 429, 444-45
(Md. Ct. App. 2006) (legitimate counseling might well have revealed Kelley’s
pro-life views).
144 In re Rogers, 775 S.E.2d 387, 390 (S.C. 2015) (concluding that a lawyer
violated Rule 1.4 when the client was confused and the lawyer failed to explain
further).
145 See, e.g,. Jackson, et al., supra note 99, 33-36 (describing complexities of
U.K. and Australian parentage law).
146 Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. McLaughlin, 171 A.3d 1205,
1217 (Md. Ct. App. 2017).
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the communication is prudent or necessary.147 Information from
the agency that pertains to the individual client, such as information about the availability of a donor, may also be relevant.
Further, lawyers must exercise prudence in communicating
with the other side to a matter. Most lawyers are keenly aware
that Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibits making false statements to third
parties. A third party for the purposes of this rule includes opposing counsel.148
In a negotiation, however, counsel may need to tip their
hand, and the relevant comment to the rule notes that estimates
as to price or value of the transaction or a client’s intentions regarding the transactions are not to be considered statements of
material fact constituting a violation of the rule.149 Further, a
lawyer need not affirmatively disclose relevant facts unknown to
his opposing counsel.150 However, a lawyer must make certain
disclosures fundamental to the matter and which if not made
would have the effect of endorsing a material misrepresentation.
For example, a lawyer must disclose the death or incapacity of
her client during negotiations.151 A lawyer also likely has a duty
to make opposing counsel aware of changes made to a document
between versions.152
Surrogacy agencies do not necessarily provide surrogates
with detailed information about the intended parent or parents.
How should a lawyer approach revealing such information? In a
recent California case, the gestational carrier reported that she
had assumed that the agency had screened the intended parent to
determine whether he was capable of caring for the triplets she
was carrying. In fact, all the agency did was to run a criminal
background check. The carrier discovered only after she became
pregnant that the father was a deaf, single parent, living with his
In re Snyder, 232 P.3d 952, 958 (Or. 2010).
Kentucky Bar Ass’n. v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Ky. 1997).
149 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1, cmt. 2 (2016).
150 Giesler, 938 S.W.2d at 580; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1,
cmt. 1 (2016).
151 Giesler, 938 S.W.2d at 580; In re Lyons, 780 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Minn.
2010);.
152 See generally In re Walsh, 872 N.W.2d 741, 748 (Minn. 2015) (finding
that an attorney who served two different versions of a complaint on opposing
counsel without alerting counsel to the differences made a material misrepresentation in violation of Rule 4.1).
147
148
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elderly parents, who had trouble paying for the surrogacy process, and was worried about his ability to care for triplets.153 If
the lawyer became aware of the gestational carrier’s misunderstanding about agency screenings, would there be a duty to correct that misimpression? If the lawyer had more information
than her client about the prospective parent, would she be obligated to provide that information? At a minimum, the lawyer
should be seen as having a duty to respond to an affirmative misstatement about the agency processes or the intended parent.
Model Rule 4.2 prohibits communications with persons
known to the lawyer to be represented by counsel regarding the
matter, unless such a communication is made with permission of
the person’s counsel or authorized by law. The rule applies even
if the represented person initiates the communication.154 While
a violation of Rule 4.2 would subject the lawyer to discipline, at
least one court has held that an agreement negotiated in violation of Rule 4.2 cannot be invalidated based on the alleged ethical violation alone.155 Nevertheless, best practices would dictate
that a lawyer not discuss the matter with an opposing party represented by counsel at all, especially where the party is unsophisticated and may not understand why the lawyer cannot discuss
the matter in the absence of the party’s counsel.
Lawyers should be especially careful in sending electronic
communications, to ensure that all contacts with an opposing
party are at a minimum copied to the party’s counsel.156 In practice, lawyers should avoid sending any communication directly to
the opposing party without the consent of opposing counsel.
However, nothing in Rule 4.2 prohibits the parties from discussing the matter among themselves without any counsel present,
and the comments to Rule 4.2 note that an attorney may properly advise her client about communications that the client is permitted to make in the absence of the lawyer.157
Goldberg, supra note 95.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2, cmt. 3.
155 In re Estate of Netzorg, 15 P.3d 926, 930 (Mont. 2000).
156 See generally In re Baker, 758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 2001) (disciplining a
lawyer for sending a letter to an opposing party which was not copied to the
party’s counsel).
157 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2, cmt. 4.
153
154
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It also likely that in representing an unsophisticated client in
a transactional matter, it will be necessary to deal with persons
who are unrepresented. Model Rule 4.3 governs interactions between a lawyer and an unrepresented party. A lawyer must ensure that an unrepresented party understands that the lawyer is
not impartial and cannot give legal advice to the unrepresented
party.158 When an unrepresented party manifests a misunderstanding or confusion regarding a transactional matter, an attorney for the represented party must advise the unrepresented
party to obtain counsel and must correct any material misunderstandings of fact to avoid assisting her client in making a material
misrepresentation.159 Further, an attorney must be especially
careful to avoid making misrepresentations where the attorney
might benefit financially from the outcome of the matter.160 In a
case in which the attorney owns or has a relationship with an
agency and also represents the intended parents, unrepresented
parties may believe that the attorney speaks for the agency or at
least has information about agency practices.

V. Advising Clients About Uncertainty in
the Law
It cannot be overstated how much uncertainty there is in the
practice of ART law. Even if a surrogacy arrangement takes
place in a jurisdiction like California that has clear law on the
subject, the intended parents cannot rule out the possibility that
a gestational carrier will flee to another jurisdiction, such as
Michigan, where she will be the legal parent.161 In addition, surrogacy contracts routinely include provisions such as the right of
the intended parents to decide on abortions or the agreement of
the gestational carrier to attend medical appointments that are of
dubious enforceability. No court will specifically enforce a clause
such as one compelling an abortion – or prohibiting an abortion
158
159
160

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3.
In re Faraone, 722 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Del. 1998).
See generally Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Dobbs, 94 P.3d 31, 58-59 (Okla.

2004).
Forman, supra note 65, at 30 (describing a case in which a surrogate
deliberately relocated during pregnancy to Michigan where surrogacy contracts
are void as against public policy).
161
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– that affects the bodily integrity of the gestational carrier.162
Nonetheless, agreement on such clauses may be important to
both parties, and contracts may provide for financial penalties in
the event of a dispute that may be enforced separately.163
Given the legal uncertainty, the clients’ greatest protection
comes from the good faith compliance of all of the parties involved in the process. This raises questions about the role of lawyers not only in drafting contracts, but in making sure that the
parties understand the terms. It also raises questions about
whether the attorney’s obligations should go beyond the contract
itself to consideration of the process of selection and review of
the parties.
A. Drafting Advice
The lawyer should explain, on a provision by provision basis,
all material portions of the proposed agreement. While this is
indeed time-consuming, it is critical that the client comprehends
every significant portion of the donor or gestational carrier contract. It is understandable that most clients will want to focus on
the financial compensation provisions, but those form just some
of the important parts of the agreement. Particular attention
should be paid to explaining those sections that deal with the
“worst case” scenarios, such as termination of a pregnancy. In
addition, attorneys have a clear ethical obligation to inform clients that parts of the contract may not be legally enforceable.164
162 Id. at 34 (referring to a “consensus that specific performance of such
provisions would never occur but disagreement about whether a surrogate
could be liable in damages for breach of contract.”).
163 Indeed, the risk of litigation itself should be seen as a factor of importance to the parties. One surrogacy case involving triplets, for example, involved extensive litigation in Pennsylvania over custody of the triplets, see J.F.
v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), a separate suit in Ohio for breach
of contract, J.F. v. D.B., et al., 9th Dist. No. 22709, 2006-Ohio-1175 (2006), litigation involving the egg donor, and a suit against the hospital. See Andrew
Vorzimer, Father of Triplets Who Temporarily Lost Custody to Surrogate
Mother Dies, SPIN DOCTOR (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/
2011/02/18/father-triplets-temporarily-lost-custody-surrogate-dies/. See also
Robert E. Rains, What the Erie “Surrogate Triplets” Can Teach State Legislatures About the Need to Enact Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 56
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2008) (describing the multiple suits in the case).
164 See Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 989, 1016 (2010) (suggesting that the drafting attorney should
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Often, it is these portions of the contract that have the biggest potential for both current and future disagreement.165 It is
also these sections of the contract where the parties rely most
heavily on the parties’ voluntary agreement, and where the potential for misunderstanding exists.
The United States remains sharply divided on abortion166
and both intended parents and gestational carriers may have
strong views on the acceptability of abortion. Surrogacy agencies
should attempt to match contracting parties with similar views.
Indeed, it would be irresponsible for an agency to pair a carrier
strongly opposed to abortion with intended parents who regard it
as an important safeguard to prevent birth of a child with serious
birth defects. Nevertheless, contracts should not just address
these matters, but lawyers should call the parties’ attention to
certain provisions that the parties may not fully consider in advance. These include:
— Selective reduction. Particularly if the gametes come
from older parents, doctors may wish to transfer multiple embryos. Yet, the greater the number of fetuses, the higher the risk
of birth defects.167 The intended parents in such a case may want
“selective reduction,” that is, the abortion of one or more of the
fetuses.168 In the California dispute mentioned above, the in“conspicuously disclose” potentially invalid terms); Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 487, 496-504
(2006) (observing that intentionally including invalid clauses could constitute
fraudulent conduct and the inclusion of “iffy” clauses without advising the client that they are unenforceable could also violate ethics rules).
165 Disagreements about termination of a pregnancy have given rise to
several high profile conflicts. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 95; Thomas B.
Scheffey, Surrogate Rejected $10,000, Left State To Avoid Demand for Abortion, CONN. L. TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2012), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/almID/
1202591498368/?slreturn=20180026224852.
166 Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 7, 2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/ (showing
sharp divisions by party, ideology, and religion).
167 See Jane E. Brody, Some I.V.F. Experts Discourage Multiple Births,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/well/family/
eexperts-advise-minimizing-multiple-births-through-ivf.html. See also Forman,
supra note 65, at 51.
168 See, for example, Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, The
Law, and The Contracts 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 533-34 (2015), which
provides an example of a selective reduction clause:

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\31-1\MAT101.txt

Vol. 31, 2018

unknown

Seq: 45

24-SEP-18

Surrogacy Professionalism

14:18

45

tended father wanted to abort one of the fetuses in a triplet pregnancy. The gestational carrier, who said she would not have
aborted a child with serious birth defects, objected to the termination of a healthy child. She said, after the dispute materialized,
that she had not read the contract, nor had the section addressing
abortion and selective reduction been explained to her.169 Had a
discussion of this issue occurred, it is possible that the intended
father might have chosen a different surrogate, the contract provision might have been changed, or the parties might have chosen to transfer fewer than three embryos.170 The conflict might
have been avoided.
Corresponding to the discussion of selective reduction is discussion of the number of embryos to be transferred. Intended
parents who have endured multiple rounds of failed IVF or who
are worried about their ability to afford surrogacy may want to
transfer a larger number of embryos to insure a pregnancy. Yet,
if the parties are not willing to abort multiples, they should expressly limit the number of embryos transferred from the outset.171 Even if they agree on selective reduction, they should
discuss limiting the number of embryos in light of potential risks
to the carrier or the health of multiples. A discussion of this issue at the outset may lessen conflicts later.
—Serious birth defects. Many intended parents and gestational carriers are willing to agree to abortion in the event of
Example 3-13: Selective Reduction: The parties hereto agree that if
the Surrogate becomes pregnant with [two] [three] or more embryos,
that the intended Parents will have the right to request a selective reduction up until the [12th][20th] week of pregnancy, as measured from
the date of insemination. If such a request is made, then the Responsible Physician will identify the embryos with the lowest chance of survival and will terminate that or those embryos, allowing the most
viable to remain and develop. Understanding that such a provision is
not specifically enforceable, the Surrogate agrees to respect and follow
the wishes of the Intended Parents in this regard. In any event, the
parties agree that if any Responsible Physician advises that continuing
to be pregnant with multiples puts the Surrogate’s life or health at risk,
then the Surrogate shall have the right to decide to terminate any or
all of the embryos at any time.
Goldberg, supra note 95.
Given the use of donor eggs from a young woman, implantation of
three embryos violated the ordinary practice in such cases. Id.
171 Forman, supra note 65, at 34.
169
170
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serious birth defects without necessarily agreeing as to what constitutes such a defect.172 In addition, information available at various stages of a pregnancy may not clearly indicate how serious
potential birth defects are. Given the intrinsic uncertainty of predicting these matters in advance, the more important questions
may be: a) how strongly are the parties opposed to abortion absent proof of severe birth defects and b) who should decide?
Discussions of these two questions may provide a framework for
a decision and establish an understanding between the parties
that goes beyond the mere language of the contract.
—Conduct during the pregnancy. Surrogacy contracts typically prohibit surrogates from smoking, drinking, and other conduct during the pregnancy that may harm the fetus.173 These
provisions are also of dubious enforceability, and even if the intended parents could sue for breach of contract, the damages
would be uncertain. Again, a discussion that underscored these
clauses and produced agreement would offer greater practical
protection than simple recitation of the contract provisions.
Attorneys for both parties should explain that the provisions
are unenforceable.174 The attorneys may want to explain and the
attorney for the intended parents may want to insist that both
parties are told that the agreement is in part a matter of trust; the
provisions are in the contract as part of a genuine effort to insure
that the parties are in agreement, and that the intended parents
are relying on the gestational carrier to comply with the contract
whether or not the provisions can be legally enforced.175
172 See, e.g., the clause in the Kelley case, which provided that: “The Gestational Carrier agrees to selective fetus [sic] reduction or/and abortion in case
of severe fetus [sic] abnormality as determined by 3-dimentional [sic] ultrasound test with following pathology expertise, or by any other procedure or
test(s) used to diagnose sever[sic] fetus abnormality.” Id. at 34.
173 See Angie Godwin McEwen, So You’re Having Another Woman’s
Baby: Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 277 (1999) (stating that surrogacy agreements “may require the gestational surrogate to refrain from smoking, consuming alcohol, or
using unnecessary drugs during the pregnancy.”).
174 See supra note 162.
175 See Julia Dalzell, The Enforcement of Selective Reduction Clauses in
Surrogacy Contracts, 27 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 83, 106 (2018) (arguing for enforceability of selective reduction clauses and discussing possible
remedies).
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Of course, the agreement may also include financial provisions that are more likely to be legally enforced. Where a carrier, for example, refuses to have an abortion, the contract may
provide for termination of any remaining payments due under
the agreement. If the carrier flees to another state to ensure that
she will receive recognition as a legal parent, the surrogacy contract may be unenforceable in that state, thus terminating the financial obligations due under the agreement.176 The intended
parents, particularly if the father is also the genetic parent, may
nonetheless find themselves liable for child support.177 This may
not necessarily preclude, however, an action for damages in the
state in which the contract was formed.178 Lawyers may not necessarily need to explain how legally complex enforcement is, only
that there is no guarantee either that the contract clauses will be
enforced as written or that they can be ignored with impunity.179
B. Matching Advice
Given the level of uncertainty underlying fertility agreements, the parties achieve their greatest protection from the voluntary agreement of the parties and their good faith performance
of the terms of their agreement. In this context, the agency process that screens prospective surrogates and donors and matches
them with intended parents is critically important. Intended parents rely on this screening and reputable agencies take the process seriously.180 Most surrogacy cases gone wrong involve
defects in screening. The agency that chose Mary Beth Whitehead as a surrogate in the Baby M case ignored warnings that she
would have difficulty giving up the child.181 In the case of a surroForman, supra note 65, at 47.
Id.
178 See, e.g., J.F., 879 N.E.2d 740 (awarding the biological father damages
that included reimbursement for child support where the gestational carrier refused to surrender triplets).
179 See, e.g., Dalzell, supra note 175, at 110 (emphasizing that “[s]urrogates
should be held to their contractual agreements because the intended parents
relied, to their detriment, on the surrogate’s commitments.”).
180 Forman reports that “[t]he ASRM guidelines require surrogates to go
through mental health evaluation and counseling as part of the screening process for eligibility, as do several of the statutes that permit surrogacy.” Forman,
supra note 65, at 51.
181 Sanger, supra note 140, at 90.
176
177
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gate who fled to Michigan rather than undergo an abortion, there
were also “red flags” that the agency ignored.182 In other cases,
the surrogate developed concerns about the intended parents
that were also predictable. The California surrogate who refused
to abort one of the triplets she was carrying expressed concern
about the intended father’s ability to care for the triplets as she
learned more about him.183 A different Michigan case involved a
surrogate selected from a website, who declined to surrender
twins because of her concerns that the intended mother, who suffered from bipolar disorder controlled by medication, might not
be a fit mother.184 The meltdown in all of these cases might have
been preventing through adequate screening of surrogates, and
counseling to help match surrogates and intended parents. The
question is whether attorneys have any responsibility for this
process.
In the case of an attorney who also owns a surrogacy agency
selecting gestational carriers and who also represents the intended parents in a negotiation with the surrogate, the answer
should be that the attorney clearly bears a non-waiveable obligation to insure the adequacy of the screening process. That
screening is an important component of the services the agency
provides. The reliability of the screening, particularly one that
evaluates the likelihood that a surrogate will surrender children
born through the process, should be an important factor in an
intended parent’s decision to go ahead with a surrogacy agreement. In addition, intended parents will rely on the agency’s
evaluation of a potential gestational carrier’s beliefs about abortion and likelihood that she will honor the abortion provisions in
the contract. The agency may be able to enter into an agreement
with the intended parents in which they need not reveal every bit
of information provided in a psychological screening. But an attorney who owns such an agency should be charged with sufficient information about the nature of the screening to determine
whether the screening meets professional standards, and whether
there is any basis for concluding that a surrogate will not honor a
provision that the attorney has proposed or inserts at the request
of the intended parents. Given the requirement that attorneys
182
183
184

Forman, supra note 65, at 51.
Goldberg, supra note 95.
Saul, supra note 52.
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with conflicts of interest like these must insure that the transaction is “fair and reasonable to the client,”185 that should mean an
obligation to insure the adequacy of the screening and to disclose
possible reservations about proposed surrogates to the intended
parents.
Even if the attorney simply owns the agency and does not
independently represent the intended parents, such a duty may
exist. In one of the first surrogacy cases, a traditional surrogate
sued Noel Keane, an attorney and owner of a traditional surrogacy-matching program, for negligence when she was infected by
artificially inseminated, untested sperm from the intended father.186 The Sixth Circuit found that a “special relationship” had
been established and that Keane and the others named in the suit
owed affirmative duties to the Stivers and to Malahoff [the intended
father], the surrogacy program beneficiaries. This duty, an affirmative
duty of protection, marked by a heightened diligence, arises out of a
special relationship because the defendants engaged in the surrogacy
business and expected to profit thereby. Keane owed a duty to design
and administer a program to protect the parties, including a requirement for appropriate testing.187

In a second case, a second traditional surrogate sued Noel
Keane and a different surrogacy-matching program he ran for
wrongful death after the child she carried for a single father died
within weeks of his birth from shaken baby syndrome and the
father was convicted and jailed for manslaughter.188 The Pennsylvania court, in following the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, ruled that:
[A] business operating for the sole purpose of organizing and supervising the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps handsome
profits from such endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of the surrogacy undertaking because a “special relationship” exists between the surrogacy business, its client-participants, and
most especially the child which the surrogacy and undertaking
creates.189

These obligations arise from the nature of the agency’s business rather than from an attorney-client relationship. Subsequent litigation has not tested these principles. In particular, the
185
186
187
188
189

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(1).
Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 268.
Huddleston v. ICA, 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
See Crockin, supra note 1, at 14, 16.
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courts have not addressed whether gestational carriers enjoy the
same consideration as traditional surrogates with respect to
screening of prospective parents.190 And many observers oppose
screening intended parents for suitability on the grounds that
agencies would then be likely to exclude single parents or disabled parties.191 Nonetheless, agencies are likely to have some
obligation to screen,192 and an attorney with such an obligation
arising from the agency relationship must take this obligation
into account in any subsequent representation of the parties to a
surrogacy agreement.
This may raise a particularly devilish conflict of interest for
attorneys who both own agencies and represent the intended
parents. The agency may have some obligation to screen the intended parents for the benefit of the surrogate at the same time
that the intended parents may object to such screening. The conflict would be less, however, if state law mandated such screening
(e.g., for disease that could infect the surrogate) or prohibited the
inquiry as discriminatory. Even in the absence of a state mandate, attorneys would have more protection from potential conflicts if the agency explained to potential clients at the outset that
the agency required such screening. In that event, the agency
should also take steps to insure that the surrogate was comfortable with the findings from such a screening. Accordingly, while a
client may waive the right to know all of the information the
agency discovers in screening procedures, an attorney owner
should remain responsible for taking the adequacy of the screening process into account in representing the parties and drafting a
In Huddleston, 700 A.2d at 457, the court noted that the surrogacy
agency has waived it ability to contest the surrogate’s standing to bring a wrongful death action on the basis of the child’s death.
191 Forman, supra note 65, argues that agencies should “screen” surrogates
and donors for the benefit of intended parents, but counsel the parties to insure
that they are appropriate matches for each other. She expresses concern that
screening intended parents would involve discrimination on the basis of age,
marital status, handicap, and other factors that involve impermissible discrimination. Indeed, surrogates who have expressed concern about intended parents
have often done so on the basis of handicap (deafness, bipolar disorder) or
marital status.
192 Some state surrogacy statutes and some professional associations require it. Id.
190
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contract, and securing waivers of any potential conflicts of
interest.
Independent attorneys who represent parties in a surrogacy
contract face different issues. Ordinarily, in evaluating contracts,
they do not pass judgment on agency procedures and, indeed,
they may not be in a position to know directly what the agency
does in such screenings. Nonetheless, they, too, have conflicts of
interest if their referrals come directly from such agencies. They
can expect that the more issues they raise about agency procedures, the fewer referrals they will receive. At a minimum, such
attorneys should have an obligation not to misrepresent
whatever information they have about an agency and the regularity of its procedures.
If, however, attorneys in a surrogacy negotiation encourage
the parties to reach agreements on matters unlikely to be legally
enforceable, they may be in a position to judge the suitability of
the parties to reach agreement with each other. They may also
be in a position to encourage the parties to seek out more information about each other, and perhaps to discuss directly sensitive
matters such as abortion. The more the parties are in communication with each other, however, the greater the risk that negotiations may stall or that the parties will develop doubts about
each other.
The solution to these intrinsic conflicts of interest is for professional organizations to adopt guidelines to standardize procedures. Proposals exist to address the conflicts of interest that
arise from attorneys who own agencies by limiting their involvement in preparing agreements for other parties.193 These proposals do not address, however, agency ability to direct referrals to
attorneys who serve their interests; and independent attorneys,
even if truly independent, may not be in a position to safeguard
client interests by insisting on more information from the agency
about its screening procedures, the quality of the medical professionals who will inform the procedures, or other matters. On the
medical side, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
has adopted guidelines that require surrogates, among other
things, that “to go through mental health evaluation and counsel-

193

Crockin, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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ing as part of the screening process for eligibility.”194 It is time
for legal professionals to adopt similar guidelines for the conduct
of legal representation in the surrogacy context.

Conclusion
It is for these reasons that the authors stress that representation of the typical ART client must be free from even the appearance of a conflict of interest. Clients in an ART transaction must
get legal advice that is truly honest and tailored to the needs of
the individual client’s situation. Individually disclosing conflicts
of interest and obtaining client waivers seems inevitably fraught,
and particularly difficult to do with unsophisticated clients.
In the current surrogacy context, where contracts are of dubious enforceability, many parties to the agreements respond by
questioning the point of spending money on lawyers. A study of
Australians engaged in cross-border surrogacy arrangements
found the intended parents often explained that they did not consult lawyers, because they did not think that lawyers could add
anything to the process. Harry, for example, who used a surrogate in Thailand, stated that, “I think because there wasn’t really
explicit laws to refer to, that’s why I think engaging with lawyers
either here or there was less useful.”195 Tom, who undertook
surrogacy in India, commented on the contract he signed:
Look, I was following what people were saying about contracts and to
get the contract looked at . . . I think some of the advice that people
have shared was it costs a lot of money to have your contracts looked
at and it’s not actually legal or legally viable in Australia anyway. . . . I
decided not to seek legal advice because I just thought it was almost
pointless.196

These comments reflect the notion that what lawyers do is to
secure compliance with the law. If there is no law, or if the clients come from a jurisdiction in which American law does not
matter, they do not see the point of legal representation. In California and other states that do recognize surrogacy contracts and
mandate legal representation, the lawyer may matter – but solely
for the purposes of securing the validity of the agreement or, if
194
195
196

Forman, supra note 65, at 51.
Jackson et al., supra note 99, at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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necessary, judgments recognizing parenthood. Where the primary purpose of legal representation is to review a contract,
however, the question arises: why should a client pay for a lawyer
if the lawyer is unlikely to alter the terms of the agreement?
Answering that question – why is it worth it to pay the cost –
requires defining the attorney roles. Today, agencies structure
surrogacy agreements in accordance with the lessons learned
from what has gone wrong in the past.197 What lawyers add is
the drafting of surrogacy agreements that do two things: securing
legal parenthood where the law permits it and negotiating a genuine meeting of the minds where the law is uncertain. Doing
both would be more effective with ethical guidelines that lock in
attorney obligations in defined and predictable ways.
We conclude therefore that attorneys are important to the
surrogacy process and attorney participation would be more valuable with greater accountability. Conflicts of interest in the process may be an inevitable part of a contract drafting system
dependent on referrals from interested parties and the inclusion
of repeat players in a position to evaluate not only contract
terms, but the reputation and reliability of the professionals involved in the process. Standardizing the attorney role and holding those with clear conflicts of interest to a higher standard of
accountability are necessary to insure the professionalism of the
practice.

197

Carbone & Madeira, supra note 25.
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